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Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM L. BEEZLEY, 
Defendant, 
vs . 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Third Part Defendant 
Case No . 
8411 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This suit was instituted by plaintiff against the 
defendant based upon the ground of cruelty, and 
for the purpose of having certain real property 
decreed in her, on the 8th day of May, 1952. That 
there has been no children born as issue of said 
marriage. That plaintiff and defendant were married 
at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 12th day of June, 
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1932. That defendant answered and filed a counter-
claim claiming an undivided one half interest in the 
property claimed by plaintiff under a partnership 
agreement between the pa~ties hereto. That during 
the month of August, 1952 said parties entered into 
an agreement of reconciliation, wherein the de-
fendant agreed to give up in its entirety the use of 
intoxicating liquors, and based upon said promise 
the parties resumed there former status of husband 
and wife and cohabited together at the El Dumpo 
four plex, 171 East 9th South and 150 South 7th 
East known as El Vego apartments, Salt Lake City. 
That said relationship continued on up and until the 
17th day of July, 1953, at which time the plaintiff 
terminated said renewed relationship without any 
provocation whatsoever upon the part of this de-
fendant. That at aU times the defendant kept and 
performed his part of said agreement, and that a 
complete condonation was in effect at the time plain-
tiff arbitrarily terminated same. 
The plaintiff and defendant purchased the Har-
rison Avenue home on or about the 8th day of Sep-
tember, 1932 ·and the only amount paid thereon by 
plaintiff was the sum of $125.00, and the defendant 
made all other payments that were made thereon. 
Said property was held jointly by the parties. That 
thereafter on or about April 1st, 1936 the plaintiff 
.and defendant entered into an oral partnership 
.agreement wherein it was agreed that they would 
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become joint partners and lend their efforts in ac-
quiring income bearing property located in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and to deal generally in such property 
and share equally in such property and profits as 
joint partners. That thereafter on or about April 
20th, 1936 defendant turned over to the plaintiff 
three lots that he owned in Lambs canyon which in 
turn were used in the purchase of a house on 9th 
avenue. Defendant renovated and improved the 
property which thereafter was sold at a profit after 
renting the same. That the title was held jointly by 
the parties. 
That the plaintiff and defendant examined in-
vestment property known as the Monteray Apart-
ments located at 148 East 7th South, Salt Lake City, 
for the purpose of determining whether the property 
would be a good investment; thereafter on or about 
the 27th day of November, 1937 the property was 
purchased by plaintiff, based upon the following 
considerations: That on the 20th day of November, 
193 7 Elias Hansen mortgaged his home to Tracy 
Loan and Trust Company for $4,000.00 adding there-
to $800.00, together with $200.00 applied by plaintiff 
making down payment of $5000.00 thereafter plain-
tiff and defendant signed a mortgage for the sum of 
$3000.00 and assumed a mortgage in the sum of 
$4500.00 on the 24th day of November, 1937, which 
was essential or the purchase would not have been 
closed. Said apartments were purchased for $12,-
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500.00. That thereafter plaintiff and the defendant 
signed and executed note and mortgage in favor of 
Tracy-Collins Trust Company on the 22nd day of 
March 1938 which money so ·borrowed was used 
' ' to pay off the mortgages of $3000.00 and $4500.00 
hereinabove set forth. That the income from the 
operations of Monteray Apartments was applied upon 
the mortgages signed by the defendant, together with 
home mortgage executed by Elias Hansen and wife. 
That on April 26th, 1938 plaintiff executed a deed 
in favor of Elias Hansen and wife to an undivided 
one-half interest in the Monteray Apartments. That 
plaintiff executed a note and mortgage on Monter~y 
Apartments in favor of Elias Hansen in the sum of 
$9500.00 on the first day of April, 1943 which was 
later paid off. That the defendant furnished three 
automqbiles, Ford, Hudson and Dodge, which plain-
tiff used in the operations of the Monteray and El 
Vego Apartments. That the Harrison Avenue pro-
perty came under the partnership agreement when 
formed. That at the time of the purchase of the 
Monteray Apartments plaintiff and defendant agreed 
to keep such arrangement a secret, due to the ill 
feelings existing between the defendant and Elias 
Hansen and wife. During the operation of the Mon-
teray Apartments Elias Hansen over a period of eight 
years visited plaintiff and defendant at their apart-
ment based on his evidence as follows: 
A. "Oh, yes. I think Mr. Beezley did sonie 
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of that, taking the garbage out, although I never 
went down there. I don't think I was in that apart-
ment half a dozen times." see defendants Ex. 31-P. 19. 
That the plaintiff and defendant lent their serv-
ices in the operations of both apartment buildings on 
up and until this action was instituted at which time 
the plaintiff repudiated and breached the agreement 
between the plaintiff and defendant. That plain-
tiff acknovvledged the rights of defendant as set forth 
in the counterclaim on file herein, by virtue of D. 
Exs. 5 and 6. 
That on or about July 1st, 1940 defendant 
caused to be organized, while operating the Mon-
teray Apartments, what was known as "Central 
Civic and Beautification League of Salt Lake City, 
Utah." That said League operated in a radias of 
twenty blocks in and around the Monteray Apart-
ments for the express purpose of beautifying and im-
proving the particular locale. That the defendant 
devoted a great deal of his time and attention to the 
League over a period of approximately five years with 
good r~sults. 
That on July 5th, 1945 the Monteray Apart-
ments were sold for the sum of $27,000.00, at which 
time Elias Hanson was paid off in full and the ac-
counts between Elias Hansen and plaintiff respect-
ing the operations were balanced. That on July 
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12th, 1945 Elias Hansen and wife purchased the El 
Vego Apartments subject to a mortgage of $45,000.00; 
purchase price $65,000.00 with a down payment of 
$19,500.00 half of which was plaintiff's interest in 
the sales price derived from sale of the Monteray 
Apartments, leaving balance of $45,000.00. That on 
the 14th day of July, 1945 Elias Hansen and wife 
deeded an undivided one half interest in the El V ego 
Apartments to the plaintiff. That at the time of sale 
of Monteray Apartments the furniture and furnish-
ings owned and held by plaintiff and defendant 
went in on the sale of the property for the sum of 
$500.00 and a bill of sale given to the purchaser 
therefore. 
That during the operations of both apartments 
the plaintiff and defendant had a joint account for 
goods, wares and merchandise with Sears-Roebuck & 
Company at Salt Lake City, where both parties 
charged for merchandise to be used in the Monteray 
and El Vego Apartments. That the deed given to 
purchaser of Monteray Apartments when sold \Yas 
executed by plaintiff, Defendant, Elias Hansen and 
wife. That in 1946 plaintiff and defendant sold the 
Harrison property and purchased what is known as 
El Dumpo a four plex apartment and they held same 
jointly which is of the value of approximately $15,-
·000.00. 
That said property is free and clear of encum-
·brances. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in finding that the evidence in 
this cause was sufficient to show that the defend-
ant, William L. Beezley, committed additional 
acts of cruelty, which in effect revived the original 
grounds for divorce as alleged by plaintiff. That 
William L. Beezley kept and performed the 
agreement of reconciliation in its entirety. That 
his conduct complained of in no manner consti-
tuted cruelty. 
2. That the court erred in the trial of this cause in 
which he failed to impress equity and title to 
the property involved herein in the defendant, 
William L. Beezley, under and by virtue of a 
partnership agreement existing between them. 
That the evidence and testimony as disclosed by 
the record herein amply proved by a preponder-
ance thereof that such partnership agreement 
existed between plaintiff and defendant with part 
performance thereunder by both parties con-
cerned therewith. 
3. That the court erred in decreeing unto defendant 
an undivided one half interest belonging to 
plaintiff in and to what is known as El Dumpo 
situated at 171 East 9th South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. That no findings were made to support 
said delivery of title to defendant, and that said 
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title thereto was not in issue as framed by the 
pleadings and no relief asked for by either party 
to this action. · 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. At the outset we refer to the pleadings 
of the parties to this action, which frame the issues 
involved, to-wit; Complaint of plaintiff, the Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim of the defendant, the Third 
Party Complaint of the defendant, the Answer of 
the Third Party Defendant, the Amended Reply to 
the Amended Answer and Counterclaim of the de-
fendant, the plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint, and 
defendant's answer to plaintiff's Amended Reply, 
J. R. 1-2; 40-42; 62; 31-36; 43-44; 21-23; 58-60; 
74-76. 
As to the above Point two issues arise ( 1) did 
the parties agree to resume there marital relations 
subsequent to divorce action (2) thereafter did the 
defendant commit additional acts of misconduct 
that would constitute cruelty under the record. As 
to the first point there is no dispute as to a reconcilia-
tion and the resumption of co-habitation up to and 
including July 17, 1953 at which time plaintiff 
.arbitrarily cancelled the arrangement. 
The court found no facts in this connection and 
set forth nothing but conclusions of law. J. R. 86-90. 
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The plaintiff testified that defendant was always 
claiming an interest in the property during their 
married life; so, making his demand again would 
raise nothing new which would constitute cruelty. 
Plaintiff testified that defendant desired Elias Hansen 
to move out of El V ego. Taking her evidence for 
what is is worth, the record clearly shows ill feelings 
between the defendant and Elias Hansen, and such 
statement, if made, would not be grounds for repudia-
tion of the reconciliation, and plaintiff made no ef-
fort to work out other arrangements, but instead 
cancelled arbitrarily. See deposition of plaintiff P. 
35 "She would dismiss the case and start all over, 
if we could agree on her terms." P. 53. 
Q. Why did you require a deed from El Vego 
from him? 
A. Because he was always claiming that he did 
have an interest. D. Ex. 30, P. 53. 
If anyone has committed cruelty in this matter 
it is the plaintiff towards defendant. See Trans. P. 
101-2-3; D. Ex. 3 Letter. Jeanne Barton. Trans. 
P. 155-6. P. 158 to 160. Wm. L. Beezley. 
Douglas vs. Douglas 99 P. (2nd) 479 (Oregon 
1940) 
The "cruelty" constituting a ground for 
divorce must be unmerited and unprovoked 
unless it is unjustified by the provocation and 
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out of proportion to the offense, and subject to 
that rule where both parties contribute by miscondu~t to marital discord, neither is en-
titled to a divorce. 
Heisler vs. Heisler 55 P. (2nd) 727 (Oregon) 
(1936) 
Generally, both parties being at fault~ 
neither is entitled to divorce. 
Walker VG. vValker 276 P. 300 (Wash.) held. 
Setting aside final decree of divorce held 
not abuse of discretion where parties sporad-
ically cohabitated after entry of interlocutory 
order. The remarriage to third party does 
not deprive superior court of jurisdiction to 
vacate final decree of divorce. The plaintiff 
had remarried after the decree became final. 
McKee vs. McKee 151 Atl. 620, (N.J. Equity). 
Miller vs. lVIiller, 3 P. (2nd) 1069 (Nevada), 
rehearing granted 6 P. (2nd) 1117, affirmed 11P. 
(2nd) 1088. 
Where injured spouse cohabits with of-
fending spouse with knowledge of his mis-
conduct, cohabitation condones misconduct. 
Where spouse intentionally brings co-
habitation to an end by misconduct which 
renders continuance of marital relations so un-
bearable that other leaves home, former and 
not latter is deserter. One spouse is not justi-
10 
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fied in leaving other unless conduct of offend-
ing spouse is such as would constitute grounds 
for divorce. 
See Lassen vs. Lassen, 7 P. (2nd) 120 
(Kansas) 
Davis vs. Davis, 68 S. E. 594 (Ga.) 
Condonation is not revocable at will and, 
accordingly, unless forfeited by subsequent 
misconduct, operates as a complete bar to any 
suit for divorce based on the offense condoned. 
Ann. Cas. 1912 C, Am. Jur. Sec. 207, Page 254. 
To constitute condonation there must be 
something of matrimonial intercourse. De-
fendant is of the opinion that his examination 
of plaintiff was legally within his bounds, and 
could not constitute cruelty. 
Plaintiff claims that her examination of 
·intercourse constituted cruelty. 
See P. Ex. 1 which is a letter signed by plaintiff 
and defendant, under date of September 5th, 1952 
agreeing to divorce under certain conditions, the 
subject matter of which was submitted to plaintiff's 
counsel before same was signed and executed. Re-
garding said exhibit defendant cites the following 
case. 
Grush vs. Grush, 3 P. (2nd) 402 (Montana) 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wife's agreement not to defend divorce 
action in consideration for agreement that 
husband's promise to pay alimony should ~e 
incorporated in decree, is opposed to pubhc 
policy. Note 78-13 C. J. 463-4. 
Point 2. This point involves the question of a 
partnership agreement wherein the plaintiff is 
charged with holding one half of her interest she now 
holds in the El Vego Apartments, together with the 
furniture and equipment contained therein in trust 
for the defendant. We desire to call your attention, 
first, to the documentary evidence in the record, 
which we contend supports said partnership agree-
ment, and defendant's title thereto. 
D. Ex. 5 vvritten by plaintiff to Tip, a sister of 
the defendant and among other things stated; "If 
Dad hadn't helped Bill and I out in purchasing this 
Apt." so we could earn a home etc. it would have 
been difficult financially and I ain't kidding because 
we are always one step ahead of the \'\'Olf." This 
statement is an absolute admission of the stand de-
fendant takes in this matter. Dated August 21, 1951. 
D. Ex. 6. Deposition in case of Wm. L. Beezley 
and Ella H. Beezley vs. Robert E. Buhler and Verl 
Ray Summers, taken August 31st, 1951, vvherein 
plaintiff testified as follows: . 
Q. Will you state your name please? 
A. Ella H. Beezley. 
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Q. Where do you live Mrs. Beezley? 
A. 1 SO South 7th East, Apartment 7. 
Q. Is that an Apartment House? 
A. That is. 
Q. How many apartments? 
A. We have twenty-four units there. 
Q. Are you the owner of the place? 
A. We are the owners, and operator or man-
ager. \'Ve have a caretaker. 
Q. You mean you and your husband? 
A. Yes. 
The above evidence was given under oath and plain-
tiff recognized the rights of defendant under their 
agreement. See Trans. P. 115-16 also see plaintiff's 
deposition P. 95-6. 
As to purchase of Monteray Apartments see D. 
Ex. 17 which is a mortgage in the sum of $3000.00 
signed by plaintiff and defendant. D. Ex. 20 which 
is the mortgage in the sum of $4500.00 assumed by 
the plaintiff and defendant. D. Ex. 18 warranty 
deed to Plaintiff covering Monteray Apartments 
under date of 24th day of November, 1937. D. Ex. 
21 Mortgage in sum of $7000.00 dated 22nd day of 
13 
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March, 1938, which money was used to pay off 
balance of the two mortgages hereinabove set forth. 
D. Ex. 8 reciting payments made on the mortgage 
executed by Elias Hansen. D. Ex. 9 reciting pay-
ments made on D. Ex. 21 above set forth. The 
moneys paid, evidenced by D. Exs. 8 and 9, came 
from the revenue derived from Monteray Apart-
ments. D. Ex. 10 Quit-Claim Deed under date of 
April 26, 1938 from plaintiff to Elias Hansen and 
wife for an undivided one-half interest in the lVIonte-
ray Apartments. D. Ex. 11 Mortgage executed by 
plaintiff to Elias Hansen for $9500.00 dated the 1st 
day of April, 1943. D. Ex. 24 Letter Head used by 
defendant in operations of Central Civic and Beautifi-
cation League of Salt Lake City. D. Ex. 4 Bill of 
Sale to Hudson Automobile from C. B. Dahl to de-
fendant. D. Ex. 13 Deed to Monteray Apartments 
signed by Elias Hansen and wife and Ella H. Beezley 
and her husband William L. Beezley to John \V. 
Springer the purchaser. Dated the 5th day of July, 
1945. D. Ex. 15. Deed of Trustee covering El. Yego 
Apartments running in favor of Elias Hansen and 
wife. Dated the 12 day of July~ 19+5. D. Ex. 16. 
Warranty Deed for an undivided one-half interest 
in the El Vego Apartments~ Elias Hansen and \Yife 
grantors and Ella H. Beezley Grantee. Dated the 
14th day of July, 1945. D. Ex. 27 pertaining to pur-
chase, mortgages, and sale of the Harrison A venue 
property, including records of payments made there-
on by defendant. D. Ex. 26. 9th A venue property 
14 
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~fi which contains contract of purchase; payment book 
1n. mortgage; deed to plaintiff and defendant; deed to 
.a~f purchaser from plaintiff and defendant. D. Ex. 28. 
~al Contains Assignment of contract of purchase to plain-
Thi tiff and defendant, together with real estate contract 
:ffilli and receipt for earnest money. 
l~ar\· 
ltetl We have called your attention to the foregoing 
exhibits which show a continuous chain of circum-
stances, both direct and indirect, surrounding the en-
tire dealings between the plaintiff and defendant, 
which in our opinion shows that the partnership 
agreement vvas in existance at the time plaintiff 
instituted this action, based upon admissions, docu-
mentary evidence and oral evidence. 
Regarding to payments made on Harrison Ave-
nue property plaintiff made two definite statements 
that are contradictory; ( 1) she made the payments 
to seller, Mr. Durtschi, and failed to obtain receipts, 
D. Ex. 30 P. 73, (2) that she made the payments 
to defendant, Trans. 39-41. Defendant testified he 
made all the payments with exception of $125.00. 
Trans. P. 124-31. Joint account with Sears-Roebuck 
Co. for purchase of equipment for both apartments. 
Trans. 116-18. Defendant was always claiming an 
interest in the property, P. 53 D. Ex. 30. Plaintiff 
would dismiss action if parties could agree upon her 
terms, and start all over. D. Ex. 30, P. 35; Trans. P. 
60. As to partnership agreement the plaintiff testi-
fied as follows: 
15 
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Q. Wherein the two of you would go, in effect, 
in partnership and acquire revenue earning property? 
A. Oh, I told him to do that. I told him to sell 
Harrison A venue and get income property. 
Q. You made an agreement to go in fifty-fifty 
on income returning property, didn't you? 
A. Yes, we did it from time to time. D. Ex. 
30, P. 72. 
Lots in Lambs Canyon turned over to plaintiff for 
investment. Trans. 42-3. As to partnership between 
the parties plaintiff testified as follows: 
Q. Just one question: At least as far as your 
evidence is concerned, you had a partnership agree-
ment with Bill, didn't you? 
A. That he should get these other properties, 
we should pool our income and try to find security. 
Trans. P. 207. 
Elias Hansen stated that Tracey Loan and Trust 
Co. and Mr. Springer wanted the deed to Monteray 
Apartments signed by Mr. Beezley by virtue of honle-
stead act, when the record shows that Tracey Loan 
and Trust had been paid off some three years prior 
thereto. D. Ex. 31, P. 12. Paid off see Ds. Exs. 8, 9 
and 21. Record shows Elias Hansen borrowed 
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$4000.00 on home four days prior to the defendant 
assuming $7,500.00 by way of mortgage which raises 
the presu1nptiun that defendant would sign the 
mortgage. f)s. Exs. 8 and 17. 
As to Homestead we cite the follovving: 
Title 28, Chapter I, Vol. 3, 1953 Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 28-1-6: If the Homestead 
claimant is married, the homestead may be 
selected from the separate property of the 
husband or with the consent of the wife from 
her separate property. 
See Williams vs. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 
56 Pac. (2nd) 674. 
That the ansvver of Elias Hansen in this cause 
alleges in paragraph 4 thereof as follows: 
"That the balance of. the purchase price 
was paid by notes secured by mortgages on 
the above mentioned Monteray Apartments. 
That one of such notes was made payable to 
the Tracey Loan & Trust Company and secured 
by a first mortgage on said Monteray Apart-
ment house. That such note and mortgage 
was signed by the defendant, William L. 
Beezley and the plaintiff~· Ella H. Beezley.'' 
J. R. P. 49. 
That the above admission shows that the defendant 
participated in the purchase price of the Monteray 
Apartments. 
:17 
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Elias Hansen claims, in effect, that defendant 
did not sign the second note and mortgage for 
$7000.00 and doesn't recall the transaction as be-
tween the first and second note and mortgage. 
Trans. P. 87 and 88. See D. Exs. 17 and 21. 
Elias Hansen stated that plaintiff made the pay-
ments on Harrison property but admitted his state-
ment was based upon what plaintiff told him, and 
did not know his own knowledge. D. Ex. 31, P. 
46. 
As to partnership agreement between plaintiff 
and defendant we call your attention to the evidence 
of the following witnesses for defendant: 
Jeanne Theresa Barney-Trans. P. 97 to 
107. 
Vernon Edward Beezley-Trans. P. 209. 
C. B. Dahl-108 to 114. 
William L. Beezley-Trans. P. 120 to 177; 
212 to 230. 
Defendant cites the following cases in support 
of his contentions regarding the real property in-
volved in this action: 
18 
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TRUSTS 
In Re Barnes Estate, 108 N. E. (2d) 88: 
So far as statute of frauds is concerned, 
trusts, even in land, may be created without 
writing. It is not necessary that an intention 
to create a trust relationship be expressed, but 
an acceptance by conduct of the terms which 
propose that a trust relationship be set up is 
sufficient. Where husband dies leaving ex-
ecuted oral contract which is void under the 
statute of frauds so far as it relates to lands, 
equity will enforce the contract and the statute 
of frauds cannot be interposed by vvife's de-
vise. Proceedings in the matter of the estate 
of Hattie Barnes, deceased. Decedent and her 
husband had divided their property equally 
between themselves and made oral agreements 
to provide the property of first spouse to die 
would pass to surviving spouse, with full power 
to consume and that upon survivor's death, 
survivor's estate was to be equally divided be-
tween heirs of both husband and wife. The 
surviving wife obtained title to realty as 
surviving joint tenant and plan was thereby 
disrupted. The hubsand's heirs filed excep-
tions to inventory of the wife's estate. The 
Common Pleas Court, Porter J., held that a 
trust would be declared in the property in ac-
cordance with the agreement. 
In Re Barnes Estate, 108 N. E. C2d) 88, Affirmed 
108 N. E. (2d) 101: 
It is not necessary that an intention to 
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create a trust relationship be expressed but _an 
acceptance by conduct of the terms whic? 
propose that a trust relationship be set up Is 
sufficient. An express trust may be created 
even though the parties do 11:ot understand 
what a trust is and the question whether a 
trust has been so created is to be determined 
from all the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. 
Trustor's declarations prior to, contemp-
oraneous with, or subsequent to transactions 
are admissable to show an express trust. 
It is competent to show by parole evidence 
the conversations had by creator of trust with 
his attorney at the time of the creation of the 
trust instrument. 
People v. Pierce, 243 P. (2d) 585, 100 C.A. (2d) 
598: 
In order to establish a trust, it is necessary 
to offer clear and convincing proof thereof, 
but such proof may be indirect consisting of 
acts, conduct and circumstances, and the 
question whether the showing is clear and con-
vincing is primarily one for the trial court. 
Ditto v. Piper, et al, 244 S. \V. C2d) 5+7, CCA 
Fort Worth, Texas, Nov. 23, 1951: 
Appellant on the death of his \Yife, the 
mother of appellee, was appointed and quali-
fied as ~ardian of t?e estate of Elizabeth, his 
only child, then a minor. In 1918 during the 
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pendency of the guardinnship, and vYhile Eliz-
abeth was about 16 years of age, appellant 
conveyed that realty in question which ad-
mittedly \Yas his separate property to Elizabeth 
by warranty deed. It seems evident that this 
conveyance was made in anticipation of a 
judgment that might be rendered against 
appellant and subsequent judgment lien and 
execution. In 1924 Elizabeth, then a feme 
sole, and 22 years of age, conveyed the proper-
ty back to her father by warranty deed. She 
testified in substance that her father told her 
that if she would execute this deed of convey-
ance, he would hold one half of the property 
in trust for her, and that when it was sold, or 
at his death, she would get one half interest. 
The appellant denied that any such promise 
was ever made by him. Appellant predicates 
his appeal on ten points, only four of which 
we shall discuss, the remainder pertaining 
largely to procedural matters vvhich we con-
sider of no merit. Appellant's point that the 
evidence is wholly insufficient to support the 
judgment is overruled. The testimony of the 
appellee, the substance of which is given above, 
is sufficient in our opinions to make an issue of 
fact for jury as to whether or not her father 
created the trust for her in this property. A 
trust may be engrafted on a deed by parole 
evidence. Faville v. Robinson, 111 Tex. 48, 
227 S . W. 938, Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 
134, 189 S. W. C C2d) 471. 
Dieter's Estate, 239 Pac. (2d) 954, 172 Kan. 359: 
An express trust may be created and must 
be deemed to be established by evidence, when 
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it is attacked by demurrer if. evidence mani-
fests an intention to create It, regardless of 
whether that manifestation be established by 
written or spoken words, . or. br co?duct. In 
a suit to enforce trusts, plaintiff s eVIdence ~as 
sufficient as against a demurrer to estabhsh 
that grantee had acquired title to real. est.ate 
under conditions and circumstances obhgatlng 
him to hold it in trust for grantees. 
After case is submitted for final decision up-
on its merits, alleged trust must be shown by 
clear and satisfactory evidence, but evidence 
need not reach that high degree of definite-
ness and certainty when tested by demurrer 
and when so tested general principles ap-
plicable to ruling on demurrer control. 
Gibson v. Gibson, (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 
May 16, 1952) 249 S. W. (2d) 53: 
Delay for more than 30 years in bringing 
suit for enforcement of oral trust in land did 
not preclude enforcement of trust where rela-
tion of trust had been acknowledged to exist 
between the parties by their actions and its 
continuance had been unbroken until date of 
suit. 
Knox v. Long, (Tex. Civil Appeal) 251 S. \V. 
(2d) 911: 
. In action to e~~orce alleged parole trust, 
evi~e~ce was sufficient to sustain award to 
plaintiff of one-half interest in oil and gas lease 
hol.d estate, certain personal property, and a 
residence, and a one-fourth interest in oil and 
gas royalty. 
22 
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Ramsey v. Connor, (Okla.) 240 Pac. (2d) 1072: 
In ejectment action, evidence tending to 
show that defendant held legal title to land 
in trust for plaintiff was sufficient to take the 
case to the jury. 
Anderson v. Cercone, 54 Utah 345, 180 Pac. 586: 
Where husband and wife live together in 
mutual confidence of marriage relation and 
husband purchased property, title thereto, 
being taken in the name of the wife, held 
possession of husband and wife was joint, and 
statute of limitations did not run to prevent 
husband from having property regarded as 
being held in trust for him. The relationship 
of parties implies that the trust is to be a 
continuing one until such time as it suits the 
husband's convenience to demand execution 
or until repudiated by wife and the statute 
of limitations does not commence to run until 
such demand or repudiation. 
Wyse et al v. Puckner, 51 N. W. C2d) 38, 260 
Wis. 365 (Jan. 8, 1952): 
A trust need not be declared in express 
terms, but proper written evidence, including 
letters in writings, disclosing facts which create 
fiduciary relationship is sufficient. 
Barrett et al v. Vickers et al Trust, 100 Utah 534, 
116 Pac. (2d) 772 (Dec. 10, 1941): 
Evidence w a s sufficiently clear~ un-
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equivocal and explicit to show . th~t ranch 
which had been bought by plaintiffs from. 
state under agreement with defendants and 
intervenors that each family was to hnve an 
undivided one-fourth interest and that plain-
tiffs and intervenors advanced down payment 
but later defendants tendered their shares es-
tablished a trust in plaintiff for each family of 
an undivided one-fourth interest in the ranch. 
Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 Pac. C2d) 
940. Parole evidence is admissable to show a 
trust relationship by operation of law. 
TAKEN OUT OF STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Bess v. McHenry, 89 Montana 520, 300 Pac. 199: 
Our court under these statutes in accord-
ance with the great weight of authority has 
held that they have no application to oral 
contracts which have been fully executed. 
Wells v. Waddell, 50 Mont. 436, 196 Pac. 1000, 
1001. In the case just cited it was held and 
we think correctly, that "the statute of frauds" 
was never intended to cloak fraud, but to pre-
vent it. Its aim was to avoid the aspersion of 
claims whicp from their very nature should 
be evidenced only by an instrument in writing 
signed by the party to be charged or his agent 
thereunto duly authorized. But when a ten-
ant has occupied the demised premises volun-
tary for the full term of the lease he may 
not invoke the invalidity of the c~ntract to 
shiel? him from payment of the rent. Webster 
v. NIchols, 104 Ill. 160; 2 Reed on Statute of 
Frauds, par. 639. Brown on Statute of Frauds 
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s. 116; Wood on Statute of Frauds s. 277; :23 
R.C.L. 706. 
While an oral contract which as an ex-
evutory agreement is invalid by reason of the 
statute of frauds, when it has been completely 
executed in accordance with its terms, it is thus 
taken out from under the operation of the 
statute. Stillinger v. Kelly, 66 Mont. 441, P. 
66, 68 Mont. 64, 216 P. 811, Mcintyre v. 
Danes, 71 Mont. 367, 229 P. 864, Hogan v. 
Thrasher, 72 Mont. 318, 233 P. 607, Gravelin 
v. Parier, 77 Mont. 260, 250 P. 823, a fully ex-
ecuted parole contract cannot be affected by 
the statute of frauds, and cannot be assailed by 
the parties, or by third persons, on the ground 
that it is not in writing. 
The rule is the same where full perform-
ance is by one of the parties only. 12 Cal. Jur. 
p. 927. 
• 
The part performance of an oral contract 
which will avoid the statute of frauds may 
consist of any act which puts the party per-
forming in such a situation that non-perform-
ance by the other would be a fraud upon 
the person executing his part of the agreement 
according to its terms. Eccles v. Kendrick, 
80 Mont. 120, 259 P. 609, Shaw v McNamara 
& Marlow, 85 Mont. 289, 278 P. 836, 27 CJ 
P. 343, 344. 
VanNatta v. Heywood (Decided Dec. 30, 
1920) 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192, involves agree-
ment to make will in consideration for services 
to be rendered. The contract between the de-
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ceased and plaintiff although an oral one, was 
taken out of the statute of frauds by reason of 
part performance by the plaintif~. The court 
held "Nothing in this title contained shall be 
construed to a bridge the power of courts to 
compel the specific performance of agreements 
in case of part performance thereof." Darke 
v. Smith, 14 Utah 35, 45 Pac. 1006; Lunch 
Covigila, 17 Utah 107, 53 Pac. 983; Karren v. 
Rainey, 30 Utah 7, 83 Pac. 333, Warren v. 
Warren, 105 Ill. 568. 
Point 3. That the trial court erred in decreeing 
unto defendant an undivided one-half interest in and 
to the El Dumpo Apartments which at the time this 
action was instituted vested in plaintiff. That the 
title at no time was in issue and the defendant at no 
time sought said interest as held by plaintiff . 
• 
CONCLUSIONS 
First. That the plaintiff is not entitled to a detree of 
divorce against the defendant by reason of con-
donation as plead and proved, and the trial 
judge should be directed to enter judgment in 
favor of defendant, no cause of action. 
Second: That defendant is entitled to be decreed 
the real property together with equipment based 
upon his claim therefore, as supported hy the 
record in this cause. 
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Third: That the court erred under the pleadings 
and record in this cause in decreeing plaintiff's 
interest in El Dumpo to defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. R. Hutchinson, Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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